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Abstract 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, or TCJA, 
reduced the federal marginal income tax rates 
of most Americans. It also doubled the standard 
deduction, created a $10,000 cap for state and 
local tax (SALT) deductions, and eliminated 
miscellaneous itemized and casualty loss 
deductions. These tax policy changes resulted 
in the percentage of income tax filers in the US 
who itemize their returns to fall from 
approximately 30% to just 10%. Since 
itemization offers an incentive for charitable 
giving, the TCJA could be expected to 
drastically reduce donations for the 20% of 
filers who no longer itemize. Medical charities 
are a particularly tax sensitive and vital sector. 
Measuring the effect of the TCJA’s reduction 
in giving incentive to the medical non-profit 
sector offers specific insights into the degree to 
which aggregate charitable giving was reduced. 
Using a dosed difference in difference model 
based on state-level tax cost of giving, this 
study estimates a -3.6 tax cost elasticity of 
giving to such charities accounting for a 27% 
smaller donation rate change in medical giving 
than would have occurred without the TCJA. 
I. Introduction 
A. Significance 
The literature on the extent to which tax 
incentives influence charitable giving is wide-
ranging and does not reach a clear consensus. 
This is problematic, as quantifying this effect 
accurately is crucial for making informed 
policy decisions. Any material changes to 
income tax rates or itemization have the 
potential to significantly increase or decrease 
an individual nonprofit’s donation revenue. 
This diverse group of organizations, which 
includes charities in the social services as well 
as educational institutions, healthcare 
organizations, and religious organizations, are 
responsible for assisting some of America’s 
most vulnerable populations. Special care and 
attention should be placed on their revenues, as 
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even a small decline could have wide reaching 
impacts on struggling individuals and 
communities. 
Previous literature has suggested that 
donations to medical charities are the most tax 
sensitive of any non-profit sector1 and are thus 
a good focal point for understanding the most 
acute effects of the TCJA. Additionally, high 
quality data on medical charities are available, 
which makes it feasible to get accurate 
estimates. More importantly, this sector does 
critical work that is especially relevant in the 
current pandemic environment. Better 
understanding the effect of tax policy on 
medical giving may have implications for 
future public health management. 
B. Tax Incentivization of Charitable 
Donations 
First Dollar Tax Cost of Giving— 
The US tax code provides filers an incentive 
to donate to charities by making these 
donations deductible expenses. Since every 
dollar donated is no longer considered taxable 
income, the “marginal price of giving” is the 
cost of a marginal one-dollar donation to 
charity when the amount saved through tax 
deduction is subtracted. This tax incentive to 
donate can be quantified by first dollar tax cost 
 
1 Duquette (2016)  
of giving, or FDTC. FDTC is simply the price 
of giving for a hypothetical one-dollar 
donation, which is often less than one dollar 
because of the tax incentives for those who 
itemize. FDTC concisely measures the degree 
to which tax law incentivizes an individual to 
donate to charity. 
For itemizers, FDTC is one dollar minus their 
combined state and federal marginal income 
tax rates in decimal form. For example, an 
itemizing donor who has a combined marginal 
income tax rate of 30% spends $0.70 every 
time they donate one dollar to charity. For non-
itemizers, the FDTC is simply one dollar, as 
there is no tax incentive to donate. 
 
Last Dollar Tax Cost of Giving— 
A theoretically sounder measurement of tax 
incentive to donate is last dollar cost of giving, 
or the price of donating one additional dollar to 
charity. In practice, this is the variable donors 
are most directly influenced by when choosing 
the size of a donation, as it considers the full 
tax effect for that donation. However, the last 
dollar cost of giving is an endogenous variable 
directly correlated with several other factors, 
such as a person’s propensity to donate. It is 
therefore difficult to estimate without bias. 
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To avoid this, many studies in the literature 
use FDTC as an instrumental variable for last 
dollar cost of giving. Both variables are highly 
correlated and using FDTC in this manner 
eliminates much of the aforementioned bias. In 
this study, however, this strategy is infeasible, 
as last dollar cost of giving is not observed. As 
further examined later, this obstacle does not 
change the validity or unbiased nature of the 
results.  
C. Previous Estimates of Tax Cost Elasticity 
of Charitable Giving 
Over the past five decades researchers have 
performed an expansive number of studies 
seeking to calculate the elasticity of charitable 
giving. A meta-analysis of such studies 
performed by Peloza et. al found compiled 
estimates of elasticity across all charitable 
sectors combined ranging from -7.072 to 
+0.123 with an overall weighted mean of -
1.44.4 This mean elasticity estimate can be 
interpreted as: for every 1% increase in the tax 
price of giving to charity, the amount donated 
decreases by 1.44% on average. The over 100 
studies included in this meta-analysis utilized a 
diverse range of methodologies, many with 
intrinsic weaknesses. Below are summaries of 
 
2 Robinson (1990) 
3 Wu and Ricketts (1999) 
these methods, examinations of their 
shortcomings, and possible explanations 
beyond their broader focus as to why they 
estimated low, treasury inefficient, elasticities. 
 
Methods Using Individual Tax Return Data— 
The most direct data on the donation patterns 
of individual donors are the reported donations 
available through tax returns. These data, while 
available through the IRS in redacted form, are 
a poor method for analyzing the tax effect on 
giving for two reasons. 
The largest problem with individual tax 
return data is selection bias, as only itemizers 
are incentivized to report their giving. If a tax 
filer is a non-itemizer, then they receive no 
benefit from recording and reporting their 
donations, and thus this information is not 
recorded in available data sets. This leaves only 
data on those, mostly wealthy, individuals who 
do itemize. The behavior of itemizers is likely 
to be substantially different from non-itemizers 
due to correlated characteristics, such as 
wealth, location, employment, or types of 
charities donated to.  To study how a tax reform 
affected just these donors would likely yield 
narrow results with highly limited implications 
for large sectors of charities. Exacerbating this 
4 Peloza and Steel (2005) 
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issue is the fact that two third of taxpayers who 
itemized prior to the enactment of the TCJA 
ceased to afterwards, considerably limiting the 
data sample. 
The other broader problem with relying on 
individual tax returns are their general 
unreliability. Previous studies have shown that 
tax returns often contain several inaccuracies, 
especially in terms of self-reported charitable 
donations by itemizing filers and many other 
pieces of self-reported information by the self-
employed at large.5 6 
 
Methods Using Survey Data— 
The main alternative to using publicly 
available tax return data is to survey donors 
themselves. There exist several household 
surveys that seek to quantify a variety of data 
points covered in tax returns while avoiding the 
bias associated with the returns themselves. 
Studies have shown, however, that these 
surveys often produce inaccurate results. In 
particular, itemizers tend to overstate their 
charitable giving, just as they do in their tax 
returns.7 Furthering this point, Hurst, Erik, et 
al. state in their study Are Household Surveys 
Like Tax Forms: Evidence from Income 
Underreporting of the Self-Employed: “It is 
 
5 Scotchmer and Slemrod (1989) 
6 Joulfaian and Rider (2004) 
7 Kolm and Ythier (2006) 
naive for researchers to take it for granted that 
individuals will provide unbiased information 
to household surveys when they are 
simultaneously providing distorted information 
to other administrative sources.”8 
 
Methods Using Matching Grants as RCTs— 
Another alternative method used in the 
literature to identify how donations respond to 
incentives is the use of a matching grant 
campaign as a randomly controlled trial. For 
example, one sample of random donors is 
offered a one-to-one dollar match on a 
charitable donation, while another random 
sample is offered a two-to-one match. While in 
theory this provides the controlled 
experimental setup needed to produce unbiased 
results, in reality it does not serve as truly 
functional RCTs. The data show that matching 
grants have almost no effect at all on donor 
behavior, which is likely due to other factors 
involved in these campaigns creating 
confounding variables.9  
D. Using State Tax Variation in a Difference 
in Difference Model 
To mitigate the constraints and biases of 
these previously stated popularly used methods 
8 Hurst et al. (2011) 
9 Karlan and List (2007) 
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of calculating elasticity, this study utilizes a 
difference in difference model centered around 
state income tax variation and data from 
medical charities’ tax filings. 
When trying to utilize the reported public 
donations that charities receive to discern how 
a change in tax incentives affected giving, an 
additional element of randomness is needed, as 
simply observing the change in donations over 
time cannot isolate the effect of the tax law. 
Differences in the pre-existing state income 
taxes create this random element, as they 
remain constant before and after a federal tax 
change and vary the overall tax incentive to 
donate across the states.10  
As a hypothetical demonstration of this 
effect, consider two states A and B, with 
income tax rates of 0% and 10% respectively, 
and suppose the federal marginal income tax 
rate is 40%. For two identical itemizing donors 
who live in state A and B, the FDTC of the state 
A donor is $0.60 and the FDTC of the state B 
donor is $0.50. When new tax legislation 
reduces their federal marginal income tax rate 
from 40% to 30%, and both donors continue to 
itemize, the FDCT of the state A donor 
increases from $0.60 to $0.70 and the FDCT of 
the state B donor changes from $0.50 to $0.60. 
 
10 Feenberg (1987) 
11 S. 2254 — 115th Congress: Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. 
12 Gale et al. (2018) 
Thus, the donor in state A sees a ~14% relative 
decrease in their incentive to donate, while the 
donor in state B experiences a ~16% relative 
decrease.  
This study identifies the FDTCs of a 
representative random sample of donors in 
each state and regresses the changes in FDTC 
caused by the TCJA against the log change in 
public donations received by charities by state 
to calculate a tac cost elasticity of charitable 
giving. This regression construction is detailed 
further in the methodology section.  
E. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 reduced 
the federal marginal income tax rates of most 
Americans. Additionally, and vitally, it 
dramatically reduced the incentives for tax 
filers to itemize their deductions by doubling 
the size of the standard deduction, creating a 
$10,000 cap for the SALT deduction, and 
eliminating miscellaneous itemized deductions 
and casualty loss deductions altogether.11 The 
combined effect of these changes caused the 
percentage of income tax filers in the US who 
itemize their deductions to fall from 






drastically increasing the FDTC of those 20% 
of donors who no longer itemize. 
As shown in Figure 1, the seven states with 
no state income tax (and thus a larger portion 
of their residents who did not itemize before the 
TCJA) saw a growth in medical donations of 
~8.6% from 2016 to 2018. The seven states 
with the highest state income tax, and thus a 
larger relative decrease in incentive to donate 
due to a larger reduction in itemization, saw a 
smaller growth of ~5.8%. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Note: While both groups of states saw an increase in donations to 
medical charities, the high income tax states saw an increase that was 
over 40% lower relative to the no tax states. 
 
It is worth noting that in both groups of states 
the total amount of money donated to medical 
charities increased. This is likely due to the 
many other notable economic and social factors 
also present at the time, rather than just the 
change in tax policy. The overall strong 
economy, especially as measured by stock 
market growth, may have made some more 
willing to increase charitable giving. 
Additionally, the politically tumultuous nature 
of the last few years may have led some to 
donate more to charity in general. More 
analysis on these other incentives and how they 
relate to the TCJA and this study is given in the 
discussion section below. 
Figure 1 should not be interpreted as a causal 
quantification of the TCJA’s effect on medical 
donations, but rather as a demonstration of how 
this effect is noticeable even without the 
controlled covariates of an OLS regression. 
This difference in donations received from 
medical charities in different states as caused 
by the TCJA is more robustly explored by the 
OLS regression and further analysis provided 
below. 
II. Methodology  
Described here is the difference in difference 
model used to calculate the causal effect of the 
TCJA on public donations to medical charities, 
the sources of data used, the calculation of key 
variables, and the regression model fitted. This 
particular method of estimating elasticity of 
giving is adapted from Nicolas Duquette’s 
paper Do Tax Incentives Affect Charitable 




A. Difference in Difference Model –  
By utilizing the differences in state income 
taxes, this study creates a dosed difference in 
difference model to isolate the effects of the 
TCJA on donation to medical charities. States 
with a higher state income tax, such as 
Maryland, have a larger incentive for their 
residents to itemize their returns. This effect 
accounts for the majority of the difference in 
FDTC between high and low tax states. 
Additionally, with a top marginal rate of 
5.75%, donations to charities that are deducted 
from an individual Maryland resident’s tax 
returns cost $0.0575 less per dollar than a donor 
from a state without its own income tax, such 
as Texas. This means that if both hypothetical 
donors face the same reduction in federal 
marginal tax rates, the effect on their incentive 
to donate is different. This difference is 
substantially larger if one stops itemizing their 
returns.  
The variable this study uses that captured this 
difference is called first dollar tax cost of 
giving (FDTC), which is the average cost of 
donating one dollar for a particular state’s 
donor. FDTC accounts for both changes in 
marginal tax rates at the state and federal level, 
as well as the change in a donor’s decision to 
itemize. More detail on how this variable is 
calculated is given below. 
Figure 2 represents the average FDTC of 
each state in the years 2016 and 2018. It shows 
a decrease in the broad spectrum of combined 
federal and state income tax rates across the 
board following the enactment of the TCJA. 
However, each state experienced a unique 
magnitude in this downward shift of income 
tax rate and overall incentive to donate. These 
differences in the percentage by which FDTC 
changed between states forms the “dosage” of 




Note: Each individual point represents a state’s FDTC in the respective 
years, while the 45 degree line in the center shows hypothetical FDTCs 
in the absence of the TCJA  
B. Data Sources –  
Data used to construct the first dollar tax cost 
of giving comes from the IRS public use 
Statistics of Income (SOI) tax return files, 
while data on charity location and donations 
come from IRS Form 990 extracts. 
Headquarters location and name data for each 
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charity came from The National Center for 
Charitable Statistics Data Archive. These data 
were merged with the 990-extract data, and will 
thus be referred to as one data source  
 
IRS Form 990— 
Filing an IRS Form 990 is required for any 
tax preferred organization, including any 
501(c)(3). Larger charities file the standard 
Form 990, while smaller charities file the 
simplified Form 990-EZ.  The vast majority of 
the charities included in this study file standard 
990s, due to the large average size of a medical 
charity. 
 The information from these 990 extracts 
utilized in this study include EIN (charity 
identification number), annual public donation 
revenue, state, organization name, North 
American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) code, and date of tax filing for the 
years 2016, 2017, and 2018. 
 
SOI Public Use Files— 
The public use SOI files contain tax return 
information from a nationally representative 
sample of 4,800 filers. These data are 
somewhat redacted to conceal filer identity, but 
include income, location, marital status, age, 
and over one hundred other variables used to 
calculate tax liability. Files from the year 2016 
were used.  
C. FDTC Variable Calculation –  
In order to account for the impact that the 
TCJA had on a donor’s first dollar tax cost of 
giving, this study calculates the log difference 
in FDTC from 2016 to 2018. This calculation 
begins with the SOI public use files from the 
IRS.  
First, the SOI data, which includes 4,800 
entries, is transformed using the following 
process. States are encoded from 1 to 51 
(including Washington D.C.). The state of 
residence for every filer is changed to the same 
state code, creating an identical representative 
sample for each state. Total charitable 
contributions for each filer are then reduced to 
zero. This is repeated for every state, resulting 
in 51 tax return files. Next, a mirroring set of 
files is made, in which charitable contributions 
is set to $10. Then, this entire process is 
repeated for each state after the year has been 
changed to 2018 and all monetary variables are 
adjusted for inflation using the CPI. Once 
completed, there are a total of 204 files. 
Each file is then run though the Taxpuf27 
function in TAXSIM in order to calculate total 
tax liability. TAXSIM is a program that uses 
tax filer information as the input and produces 
total state and federal tax liability from any 
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number of filers.13 The total liability difference 
between the $0 donation and $10 donation files 
for each state in each year is then divided by ten 
to calculate the first dollar cost of giving. One 
minus the log difference between the 2016 and 
2018 FDTC is calculated to create the final 
variable. 
D. Use of First Dollar Tax Cost of Giving –  
Several studies utilize a different method of 
estimating tax elasticity of charitable giving by 
using first dollar tax cost of giving as an 
instrumental variable for last dollar tax cost of 
giving. While last dollar cost is a theoretically 
better measure of tax incentives, as the 
marginal tax rate of a donor may change as a 
result of a donation, its use in this study neither 
feasible nor necessary. 
Since we do not observe the individual 
donors for each charity, creating this 
instrumental variable model is not possible.  
Furthermore, in Duquette’s 2016 study, on 
which this study’s model is based, the same 
obstacle was encountered. In that study, the 
author created an estimated last dollar tax cost 
variable by adding data for hypothetical 
donations based on average donation amounts 
of the time. He then used FDTC as an 
 
13 Feenberg and Coutts (1993) 
14 Duquette (2016) 
instrumental variable in regression and found 
that the results were not significantly different 
from his original findings. Thus, it was 
determined that the bias created by using first 
dollar instead of last dollar tax cost is 
negligible.14 
E. Form 990 Data Filtering –  
Data from the IRS Form 990s were filtered 
the following ways prior to regression. After 
selecting for only organizations that filed as 
501(c)(3)s, entries were further filtered to only 
include those that had NAICS subcodes 
beginning in 62, which indicates they operate 
in the health sector.15 Charities that took in zero 
dollars in donations in any year were then 
removed, along with any charity not 
represented in all three years of interest and any 
charities with missing values in any relevant 
field. Charities that appeared multiple time in 
the 990 extract, which is the result of amended 
filings, were sorted such that only the most 
recent filings were included. Finally, manual 
filtering was performed to remove food banks 
that had mistakenly filed as medical charities. 
15 NAICS (2017) 
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F. Focus on Medical Charities –  
This study utilizes a dosed difference in 
difference model that attempts to find a causal 
relationship between log difference in first 
dollar tax cost of giving in a respective state 
and changes in public donation revenues for 
charities in that state. As such, this study makes 
the critical assumption that the majority of a 
charity’s donations come from instate donors. 
This is naturally untrue for many charities, 
especially those that operate across multiple 
states or otherwise interact with individuals in 
several states or countries. Nevertheless, this 
study takes many steps to ensure that it isolates 
as high a proportion of charities with mostly in-
state donations as possible. 
The largest step taken to achieve this goal is 
the narrowing of sample to include only 
medical charities. This group of charities 
consists mostly of local hospitals and clinics, 
which are assumed to receive most of their 
donations from instate. Focusing the sample on 
medical charities yields additional benefits: the 
quality of data from these charities, such as 
accuracy of filings and lack of missing fields in 
the 990 extracts, was higher than in any other 
group. This ensures the regression outcome is 
more accurate. Additionally, while this group 
 
16 The results of the regression performed with no charities cut 
from the sample is reported in Appendix Table 1 
of charities only represents a portion of the 
charitable work being done in the US, it is 
considered by many to be one of the most 
critical charitable sectors. 
In addition to studying only medical 
charities, the regressions performed removed 
the 200, 300, and 400 highest grossing charities 
in terms of public donation revenue. These 
charities had substantially higher revenues than 
the average for the sample and may have 
collected most of these donations from out of 
state. Saint Jude’s Children’s Hospital and The 
Mayo Clinic are examples of such charities. 
These exclusions had only marginal effects on 
the elasticity of giving estimate.16 
G. OLS Regression –  
The relationship between charitable 
contributions and tax incentives can be written 
as the following equation: 
(1) ln�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 ln�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� +  𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
Here, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents contributions to an 
individual charity in a given year, 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
represents the tax incentives to give to that 
charity in the same given year. 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 is a state 
fixed effect,  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is a charity fixed effect, and 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 
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is a fixed year effect. 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents the other 
factors influencing a donor’s decision to donate 
to that charity in that year, such as political 
conditions and a variety of other economic 
incentives. This variable is normally 
distributed and has a mean of zero due to the 
charity fixed effect. 17 
Next, specifying Equation 1 for the year 
2018, we have the following equation. The 
years 2016 and 2018 are abbreviated to 16 and 
18, respectively. 
(2) ln�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,18� = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾18 + 𝛽𝛽 ln�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,18� +  𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 +
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,18 
Subtracting the same equation for the year 
2016 from Equation 2, we have: 
(3) ln�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,18� −  ln�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,16� = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 −  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + (𝛾𝛾18 −
𝛾𝛾16) + 𝛽𝛽 [ln�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,18� − ln�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,16�]  +  𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 +
(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,16 − 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,18) 
 
This variable 𝛽𝛽 represents the causal effect of 
a change in tax incentives on the donations 
received by a specific charity. If we further 
develop the variable T into the tax change 
 
17 This equation is estimated for the years 2016 and 2018 in 
Appendix Table 2 
18Since the charities observed in this study are organized by state, 
and the changes in donation revenue received by the charities within 
each state are not independently distributed, it is possible that the 
standard errors reported in Table 1 are not appropriate. This is because 
the treatment assignment in this model (change in FDTC) is directly 
correlated with the subgroups (states). Increases in donations seen by 
charities between 2016 and 2018 in one particular state may be, in part, 
caused specifically by the TCJA, and specify 
the left hand side variable to include only 
changes in donations received from 2016 to 
2018 for all applicable medical charities, we 
have: 
(4) ln�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,18� − ln�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,16� = (𝛾𝛾18 − 𝛾𝛾16) +
𝛽𝛽 [ ln (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,18) − ln (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,16)] +
 (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,18 − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,16) 
 
Where i = charity, t = year, s = state, and 
FDTC = first dollar tax cost of giving to charity. 
ln�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,18� − ln�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,16� is the log change in 
contributions received by a given medical 
charity i between 2018 and 2016, and   
ln�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,16 − 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,18�  represents the 
change in log mean tax price of giving (1- 𝜏𝜏) 
from 2016-2018 in a given state s. The 
difference 𝛾𝛾2018 − 𝛾𝛾2016 represents how 
much we predict donations to have changed 
between 2016 and 2018, had tax incentives 
not changed. The difference 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,2018 − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,2016 
is normally distributed and has a mean of 
zero due to the properties of the normal 
distribution.18 
due to independent statewide characteristics, which are by definition 
correlated with that state’s change in FDTC. As a way of accounting 
for this, standard errors are clustered by state in Appendix Table 3, 
which produced an estimate for 𝛽𝛽 not statistically significant at the 
95% level but significant at the 90% level. This should be interpreted 
as an acknowledgement that, if there exist widespread, independent 
reasons within several states that caused changes in 2016 to 2018 
donation behavior and weren’t related to the TCJA, then the estimates 
of the effect of change in FDTC presented in Table 1 may be less 
significant than suggested. 
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III. Results  
The regression as described above produced 
relatively large and highly statistically 
significant estimates for elasticity of medical 
giving. This implies that the TCJA caused a 
large reduction in donations to medical 
charities. 
Table 1 show the results from the three main 
OLS regressions performed, which calculate an 
estimated tax cost elasticity of medical 
charitable giving. These estimates, which range 
from -3.61 to -3.55 are not statistically 
significantly different from one another. These 
main estimates should be interpreted as: for 
every one percent increase in the tax cost of 
giving for an individual donor, on average that 
donor will give 3.61 percent less to medical 
charities that year.  
 
 
 Excluding Top 200 Charities 
Excluding Top 
300 Charities  
Excluding Top 
400 Charities  
Intercept 
 
12.96382*** 12.93472*** 12.90469*** 
 (0.06049) (0.06013) (0.05987) 



















Notes: Dependent variable is log change in donation revenue from 
2016 to 2018. Change in FDTC is the estimate of tax elasticity of 
charitable giving to medical charities. Standard errors are shown 
parenthetically under each estimate. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
These elasticity estimates can be further 
utilized to calculate an overall reduction in 
potential medical donations for the year 2018.  
After the passage of the TCJA, American 
taxpayers saw their tax cost of giving increase 
by 7.47% on average. This figure incorporates 
both the increase due to higher marginal tax 
rates and, more importantly, lower rates of 
itemization.  
Figure 3 shows the overall decrease in 
potential donation associated with each 




Note: The calculation this graph represents is the elasticity estimates 
from the previous table times 7.47%, which is the average national 
reduction in marginal tax rate. The regressions that cut the top 200, 
300, and 400 medical charities in terms of annual revenue imply a total 
decrease in medical giving of 27.04%, 26.94%, and 26.57% 
respectively from 2016 to 2018. 
 
These estimates of the elasticity of giving to 
medical charities imply a total decrease in 
potential giving of approximately 27 precent 
between the years 2016 and 2018, or roughly a 




would have happened without the passage of 
the TCJA. 
IV. Discussion  
The model used by this study requires a 
number of assumptions that may not be valid, 
which could lead to biased elasticity estimates. 
In this section, those biases are examined and 
shown to be non-impactful. Additionally, 
further explanation is given as to why 
alternative models were not employed. 
A. Addressing of Potential Bias –  
There are several elements intrinsic to the 
design of this study that have the potential to 
introduce bias. Below is an analysis of some of 
the factors most likely to either skew the 
numerical value of the results or interfere with 
the causal interpretation of the TCJA’s effect 
on donations. These factors are shown to not 
cause significant bias. 
 
Geographic Bias— 
It is possible that states with low changes and 
states with high changes in first dollar tax cost 
of giving are geographically proximate, thus 
introducing potential bias. This would be the 
case if, for example, the states with the highest 
differences were located along the coasts, thus 
potentially causing correlated variables like 
regional culture to become confounding. This 
would be the case if these cultural differences 
were responsible for a change in donation 
behavior between 2016 and 2018 and the states 
with said changes were correlated with FDTC. 
For example, if the New England states saw an 
increase in donation to medical charities due to 
some non TCJA related factor and those states 
all had large changes in FDTC. This is a 
relatively small concern, and as Figure 4 
shows, there is no clear evidence to suggest that 
this is the case; log difference in first dollar tax 
cost of giving is randomly distributed across 




Note: Map showing geographic distribution of change in FDTC across 
the US. Darker blue corresponds to a higher difference in FDTC. 
 
Giving Biases— 
A change in average donation behavior 
between 2016 and 2018 caused by the TCJA in 
through a channel other than itemization 
incentives studied could also introduce bias. If 
the population of some states were already 
more interested in donating to medical charities 
than others before the TCJA, this difference 
14 
 
could have been exacerbated by the passage of 
the law. Since other variables are controlled 
for, this would only be a problem if there was a 
correlation between states pre-disposed to 
donate more to medical charities and a higher 
change in FDTC. 
As Figure 5 shows, this is not the case. There 
is no statistically significant correlation 
between FDTC and pre-TCJA per person 




Note: The equation of the trendline is y=-7E-06x + 0.0757 and the R 
squared value is 0.0005. This scatterplot shows no obvious correlation 
between change in FDTC and pre-TCJA per capita giving. 
B. Other Factors Effecting Donations –  
As noted in the 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 variable from Equation 1, 
and the overall increase positive donation trend 
seen in Figure 1, there were several other 
factors present that influenced an individual 
donor’s decision to give money to medical 
charities between 2016 and 2018. Some of 
these reasons, such as heightened political 
awareness due to the social climate of the time, 
are reasonably assumed to be uncorrelated with 
state-specific TCJA-induced changes in FDTC. 
Other factors, however, such as the overall 
increased wealth levels seen across the country 
due to a strong stock market, cannot be wholly 
separated from the TCJA. If the TCJA caused 
an increase in stock prices, which made people 
richer overall, it could have created a wealth 
effect that raised donations to medical charities 
overall. 
This being said, this wealth affect is 
accounted for on average in the 𝛾𝛾2018 − 𝛾𝛾2016 
portion of Equation 4. If the TCJA is to be 
considered as a whole, these wealth effects 
must be examined. However, since this study 
focuses on the price effect of tax cost on 
average donations, no assumptions are made 
about the wealth effects, as they are directly 
accounted for. Thus, they do not otherwise 
influence the results.  
V. Future Work  
It remains unknown why the medical sector 
has a heightened tax price elasticity of giving 
relative to other sectors. Both previous studies 
and this study’s own preliminary research 
found that medical charities are the most tax 
sensitive group of non-profits, followed by 
education organizations. Reasons for this fact 
are however, up to this point, speculative. It is 
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a possibility that borderline itemizing donors 
who were most directly impacted by the TCJA, 
i.e., those individuals with enough money to 
itemize but perhaps wouldn’t be considered 
rich, favor medical and educational charities. It 
is also possible, however, that this apparent 
pattern is an artefact of the higher quality data 
available for medical and education charities. 
Both medical and educational charities tend to 
be larger, and thus file the regular IRS Form 
990 instead of the substantially less detailed 
Form 990-EZ. Furthermore, it is also possible 
that due to some ingrained norms of 
institutional organization, tax forms filed by 
these organizations are more complete and 
have fewer errors or missing data points. It is 
possible that many other charitable sectors are 
just as tax sensitive, but the data are not robust 
enough to reveal this fact. Perhaps future 
studies could isolate the medical and 
educational sectors and compare them to the 
dozens of other types of charities to identify the 
cause of this calculated difference. 
VI. Conclusion  
By using a difference in difference model 
based on the changes in tax incentives to donate 
brought on by The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 
2017, this study estimates a tax cost elasticity 
of giving to medical charities of approximately 
-3.6. This change in the after tax cost of giving 
is estimated to account for a 27% smaller 
donation rate change in medical giving than 
would have occurred without the tax change. 
 These findings are particularly relevant 
given what occurred in the years after the law 
was passed. Starting in early 2020, the 
Coronavirus pandemic put tremendous strain 
on the entire US healthcare system, including 
medical charities. Due to the sudden nature of 
the epidemic, the preparedness of the many 
hospitals and clinics tasked with caring for 
COVID patients and later administering the 
vaccine was highly influenced by the charitable 
donations they had received in the preceding 
years. By quantifying the tax cost elasticity of 
giving, this study has determined that medical 
charities saw a significant drop in potential 
donations because of the TCJA, which is likely 
to have impacted their functionality at the time 
of COVID’s onset. With this added knowledge 
will hopefully come greater understanding of 
and deference to how income tax policy effects 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1— REGRESSION OF FULL SAMPLE OF MEDICAL CHARITIES 
 Full Sample 
Intercept 12.73204*** 
  (0.01820) 




 R-squared 0.0004385 
Notes: Dependent variable is log change in donation revenue from 2016 to 2018. Change in FDTC is the estimate of tax                                        
elasticity of charitable giving to medical charities. Standard errors are shown parenthetically under each estimate. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 2— ESTIMATES OF EQUATION 1 
 2016 2018 
Intercept 9.2307*** 9.1024*** 
 (0.6061) (0.6161) 
FDTC -3.8873*** 4.0740*** 





R-squared 0.001767 0.001881 
Notes: Dependent variable is log change in donation revenue from 2016 to 2018. Standard errors are shown parenthetically                                           
under each estimate. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 3— REGRESSION WITH CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS BY STATE 
  Estimate t-stat p-val (naïve-t)  
Intercept  12.66*** 221.70 <0.001  
  (0.0571)    
Change in FDTC  -3.62* -1.79 0.0791  
  (2.0184)    
Notes: Dependent variable is log change in donation revenue from 2016 to 2018. Standard errors were clustered by state using                              
the coef_test function with vocv = “CR1” in R’s clubSandwich package. Change in FDTC is the estimate of tax elasticity of                                   
charitable giving to medical charities. Standard errors are shown parenthetically under each estimate. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
